On a Domain Block Based Mechanism to Mitigate DoS Attacks on Shared Caches in Asymmetric Multiprocessing Multi Operating Systems

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Abstract—Asymmetric multiprocessing (AMP) based multi-OSs are going to be established in future to enable parallel execution of different functionalities while fulfilling requirements for real-time, reliability, trustworthiness and security. Especially for in-car multimedia systems, also known as In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) systems, the composition of different OS-types onto a System-on-Chip (SoC) offers a wide variety of advantages in embedded system development. However, the asymmetric paradigm, which implies the division and assignment of every hardware resource to OS-domains, is not applicable to every part of a System-on-Chip (SoC). Caches are often shared between multiple processors on multi-processor SoCs (MP-SoC). According to their association to the main memory, OSs running on the processor cores are naturally vulnerable to DoS attacks. An adversary who has compromised one of the OS-domains is able to attack an arbitrary memory location of a co-OS-domain. This introduces performance degradations on victim’s memory accesses. In this work a method is proposed which prohibits the surface of interference. It has been shown that the mapping of contiguous memory blocks intensifies the effect. The method enables a more reliable implementation of AMP-based multi-OSs on MP-SoCs using shared caches without the need to modify the hardware layout.

I. INTRODUCTION

Multi-operating systems (multi-OS) are going to be established in future [1]. Especially for in-car multimedia systems, also known as In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) systems, the composition of different OS-types onto a System-on-Chip (SoC) offers a wide variety of advantages in embedded system development.

The development of systems and software in the automotive environment implies special requirements and challenges [2]. In particular, one of the challenges is to integrate the widespread functions onto one single head unit [3]. Furthermore, tightly network-coupled (cloud) applications, such as social networks will gain increased entry into that environment. The utilization of multiple OSs on one platform provides the opportunity of gaining advantage of their properties. An example is the running of a real-time OS parallel to a mobile OS or a general purpose OS. The loosely-coupled component structure of SoCs offers the possibility to implement a multi-OS following the asynchronous multiprocessing (AMP) paradigm rather than following the classical virtualization schemes implemented in commodity desktop architectures. The AMP paradigm implies the total splitting of every resource in the system. Specialized hardware extensions introduced with current RISC processor architectures such as the ARMv7 [4] enable the assignment of devices and resources of the SoC to single OSs.

A. Problem Statement

Caches are often shared between multiple processors on multi-processor SoCs (MP-SoC). Thus, the asymmetric paradigm is not yet applicable to every part of a system-on-chip (SoC). The technology implies the division and assignment of every hardware resource to OS-domains. According to their fixed association to the main memory, OSs running on the processor cores are naturally vulnerable to DoS attacks. Generally this enables an adversary who has compromised one of the OS-domains to attack an arbitrary memory location of a co-OS-domain. This could introduce significant performance degradation on victim’s memory accesses. The proposed memory mapping technique prohibits the surface of interference. It has been shown that the mapping of contiguous memory blocks intensifies the effect. The method enables a more reliable implementation of AMP-based multi-OSs on MP-SoCs using shared caches without the need to modify the hardware layout.
B. Related Work

The technique of interfering with a co-OS-domain is often referenced to as cache thrashing. Similar approaches to implement multi-OS are shown in [5], [6], [7] and [8]. However, the approaches focus on IA-32 multicore architectures which are used for desktop computers. The difference to the architecture proposed in this work lies in the design paradigm, protocols and hardware compilation, which can not simply be transferred to SoC architectures. The intended solution to manage the cache allocation indirectly is introduced in [9], [10] and [11]. The authors propose the solution of coloring caches in order to avoid interference between applications. They also deal with the problem of the dynamic allocation and assignment of cache colors to applications. The solutions are implemented into the memory allocation mechanism on OS level. The approach proposed in this article differs substantially from this related work. In the case of AMP multi-OS, the memory segmentation must be enforced on system level to have the capacity of protecting the configuration. Furthermore, since the system setup is statically defined, no dynamic allocation page coloring algorithms can be implemented.

C. Methodology

The research methodology of this article is twofold. It introduces an attack vector, by deriving an algorithm from the cache coherence protocol, to affect the co-OSs running on the same platform. Using this vector, it has been shown that the mapping of contiguous memory blocks intensifies the effect. Subsequently, a memory mapping method is proposed which modifies the association of the cache to the main memory. The approach is evaluated by a proof-of-concept implementation which illustrates the performance impact of the attack and the countermeasure, respectively.

D. Structure

In Section VI a method is proposed which addresses the possible surface for interference. Furthermore, implementation issues for the solution are given in Section VI-B. To verify the concept, an attack vector is introduced in Section V, which quantifies the impact shown with an experimental setup (Section VII). All measurement results are given in Section VIII. The remainder of this article is organized as follows: In Section II the Multi-OS environment and it’s practical realization is introduced. In Section III the organization of the memory is examined. Lastly, a conclusion is presented in IX.

II. AMP MULTI OPERATING SYSTEMS

Generally, in multi-OSs two or more OSs that run concurrently on a single hardware platform are assumed. According to their capabilities, they can, but are not obliged to, be of different types. In this work, OSs are divided into three categories: real-time, general purpose and mobile. Each OS maintains its own memory as well as the physical devices provided by the hardware platform. The combination of OS, memory and devices builds an independent and self-organizing OS-domain. Figure 1 shows a semantic system overview. The difference to other multi-OS approaches (compare the related work in I-B) is that OS-domains are statically bound to a processing unit, which is usually one of the central processing units (CPU) or CPU-cores of the hardware platform. This is led by the intention of achieving a static system configuration. It is not intended to expand domains in the main memory or to reorganize the device assignments during runtime. During the boot phase all necessary initializations and configurations are set up. In comparison to classical virtualization examples, this approach avoids interfaces to manage the configuration once the system is running. The intention is to minimize the attack surface.

This proposed approach is based on asynchronous multi processing. AMP systems are not new in certain domains. Primarily an AMP system provides non-symmetric access to hardware. The term asymmetry refers to the separation of hardware resources core-by-core in the system. Each core has access to and works on a different partition of the main-memory and hardware devices. To maintain and handle the different core partitions and their applications, each partition must run an OS. In this way it is also possible to run different OSs on an AMP multicore system. This approach for encapsulation is hardware-based and requires that fundamental hardware functions to be adapted or configured to run multiple OSs. The approach is contrary to single multiprocessor (SMP) which runs a single OS on all CPU-cores and maintains all hardware resources.

A. System on Chip Structure

SoC is an integrated circuit that combines all components of a computing platform or other electronic systems into a single chip. Designing SoCs is a very demanding area in embedded system development. The platform will be constructed for their intended environment. The architecture of the system is generally tailored to its application rather than being general-purpose. This means there is usually no common structure for such platforms. Nevertheless, most SoCs are developed from pre-qualified hardware blocks (compare [12]). These blocks are connected through an on-chip network, often referred to as system-bus. In Figure 2 a generalized structure for SoCs is presented. For this work, the focus is set to a single subsystem
which implements CPUs. Furthermore, the CPU-subsystem’s connection to the main memory is considered.

B. AMP Multi-OS Realization

This section will examine issues associated with realizing an AMP-based multi-OS. In this work hardware architectures are considered which use memory maps for hardware accesses (memory mapped i/o). Each device connected to the common shared bus (CSB) is reachable by a statically defined physical address. These addresses are bundled in an i/o-address space or configuration address space if there are any configuration-registers of the device. Processors map those physical addresses to their virtual address space using a memory management unit (MMU). The MMU itself uses a translation table (TT) to match and redirect accesses to peripherals connected to the CSB. The translation table itself either resides somewhere in the physical memory space or is implemented into the MMU hardware. The whole system configuration is set during the boot phase within the privileged hypervisor mode. Figure 3 shows the CPU subsystem.

C. Centralized Memory Mapping and Peripheral Assignment

The segmentation of the addressable space as well as the assignment of certain resources, peripherals or devices is an integral part necessary for the creation of an AMP multi-OS. In this context, assignment means the device is only accessible by a single, defined OS-domain. As mentioned, the assignment will be enforced by the second stage MMU. To bind a resource to an OS-domain, it must provide an interface (configuration registers) in a dedicated address area (configuration-space). This includes clock assignments, MMU activation and signals, etc. In order to assign a resource to an OS-domain all of the configuration-registers will be mapped to its address space. The example in Figure 4 shows two OS-domains and two devices. Based on the full addressable space, each device or memory partition is assigned to a domain. As an example, if 4GB of main memory is given, the main memory could be mapped from the physical address 0x80000000 to 0xbfffffff. If an address space is shared the associated addresses are multiply assigned.

D. Address Spaces

As a result of the two staged address translations, the system deals with three different address space types.

- **Virtual address space (VA):** This space is typically maintained by the OS-domain. The addresses used in this space are referred to as virtual addresses. An address used in an instruction, as a data or instruction address, is a VA [4] and has a space of up to 32 bits.

- **Intermediate physical address space (IPA):** The IPA is the output of the stage 1 translation and the input of the second stage. If no stage 2 translation takes place, the IPA is the same as the physical address.

- **Physical address space (PA):** The address of a location in the memory map, which is an output address from the processor to the memory system.

The translation process works as follows:

\[
(VA)_{\text{stage1}}(IPA)_{\text{stage2}}(PA) \tag{1}
\]

E. Translation Tables

The MMU utilizes a translation table to convert an input address to a corresponding output address. Depending on the implementation, these translation tables are located in the PA address space of the SoC. In order to manage a huge address space, the translation tables are divided into different levels.
Typically, there are three translation Levels. According to the ARM reference [4] Level 1 maps 1GiB blocks, Level 2 2MiB blocks and Level 3 4KiB pages respectively. The input address, particularly the IPA, indexes the position in the table. Each entry points either to a memory region or to the next corresponding translation table level.

III. MEMORY ORGANIZATION

This work develops general models. Nevertheless, the organization of memory, cache subsystems, their protocols and hierarchy are based on the ARMv7 architecture specification [4]. This specification is the foundation for a significant amount of SoC platforms.

A. Caches

The general intention of the integration of caches to processors is to speed up access to frequently used memory. The memory in computing systems is hierarchically organized [13]. Regardless of the highest orders, which are the processor’s registers, there are one or more levels of cache, which are denoted as L1, L2, etc. In multi processor (MP) systems some levels are private to the processor and some are shared between multiple processors. In SMP based systems a coherence protocol maintains the synchronization of shared data. Caches expand from the lower to the higher levels. The smallest addressable entity within a cache is a cache-line (CL), which has a fixed CL size, such as 64 Byte.

The last level cache (LLC) before the main memory often has an associativity scheme. The scheme describes which CL in main memory, the memory line (ML), is loaded to a specific location in the cache. The location where a ML is loaded to, is denoted as CL_ID. The associativity between the LLC can be fully associative or could be organized into associativity-cache-way sets. Fully associative means each CL can be loaded to all possible CL_ID positions in the LLC. In most cases caches are divided into way-sets (WS). Thus, a specific ML is associated with a specific WS in cache. If a WS has a size of 8, it is called an 8-way-set associative cache. When a ML is loaded to a CL into the WS, a replacement algorithm determines the specific location. Upon implementation, this could be done by a least recently used algorithm or could be totally randomized. The CL that gets replaced, will be written back to the main memory. The number of WSs in the cache can be calculated by:

$$WS_{count} = \frac{\text{cache size}}{(CL_{size} \times WS_{assoc.})} \quad (2)$$

B. Addressing Scheme

Addressing is the fundamental part of memory accesses. Usually the smallest addressable entities in computer systems are 32Bit. As a result, a single CL contains 16 addressable locations. The data or instructions loaded into the cache can be logically/virtually indexed or physically indexed. In case of physically indexed caches the PA of a memory location identifies CSs in the cache system. As a result, VA or IPAs have to be translated through the MMUs before the data can be loaded into the cache. If processor accesses a certain memory location on main memory, the VA will be translated into a PA. In equation 3 how to determine a specific WS in cache to a given PA is shown.

$$WS_{ID} = \frac{PA}{CL_{size}} \mod WS_{count} \quad (3)$$

IV. SECURITY THREAT

The identified security threat is characteristic to this particular environment. In this area, attackers are assumed to be knowledgeable insiders and having access to non disclosure documentation of the hardware platform. Furthermore, it is assumed to deal with OS-level attacks. It is feasible to assume that an adversary might compromise and control an OS-domain. This is reasonable due to the attack surface of highly Internet-coupled mobile-OSs.

As a result, the adversary aims for vulnerabilities at system-level. Despite privilege escalation attacks (horizontal or vertical) this article focuses on DoS-attack-surfaces in the shared LLC. The attacker’s aim is to overcommit the cache from its compromised OS side in order to degrade the memory access performance on the target’s side. According to the cache associativity the attacker is able to aim for a memory access to a specific PA in the system. This access can be read or write. As an example, it is feasible for adversaries to aim at a co-OS-domain which computes the cluster device (speedometer) for the driver of a vehicle. The target would need to fetch data from the memory in a strict timing order. If the memory access is delayed by the attacker, the display of the data could be significantly delayed as well. This has an impact on the reliability and availability of the target system.

V. DENIAL-OF-SERVICE ATTACK VECTOR

In this section, the method of how to achieve interference between the two co-OS-domains will be described. Furthermore, we show how to implement the method. For our consideration, we have assumed a two-leveled cache hierarchy and 16 WS associativity of the L2 cache to the main memory.

A. Method

In order to introduce performance impact on co-OS-domains, an attack vector is examined which aims to

<table>
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<td>DBSize</td>
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<td>WSCount</td>
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overcommit a certain WS in the LLC. The memory mapping introduced in Section II-C shows that the memory partitions are assigned in two big consecutive blocks to the OS-domains, which are denoted as Memory Partition 0 and Memory Partition 1 respectively.

As shown in Figure 5, each ML in the main memory is assigned to a specific WS in the LLC. Since the main memory is bigger than the L2 cache, the pattern repeats every time \( WS_{count} \) has been reached. The method to fill a specific WS in the cache is to compute \( WS_{ID} \) according to the following equation:

\[
Block_{size} = WS_{count} \ast CL_{size} \quad (4)
\]

**Algorithm 1 Fill specified WS**

Require: \( PA \geq 0; Step_{size} > 0 \)

\[
NextPA \leftarrow PA
\]

\[
\text{for } i = 0; i \leq WS_{size}; i + + \text{ do}
\]

\[
Access_{NextPA}
\]

\[
NextPA \leftarrow NextPA + Block_{size}
\]

end for

If the attacker aims to interfere with the victim, he just has to use the same WSs as the victim. Aiming for a specific WS, and by doing this very frequently the victim’s memory accesses to this WS can be significantly delayed. According to the replacement strategy in the WSs, this effect can be deterministically predicted in case of least recently used (LRU) or statistically measured in case of random replacement.

### VI. COUNTERMEASURE

The attack vector shows that it is possible to interfere with an co-OS domain by attacking specific WSs. Since this would lead to unpredictable memory access execution delays, a method is introduced to prohibit this effect. The cache covers the whole main memory. Attributes like the associativity commonly cannot be changed in the system. Hence, a method is required which is applicable without the introduction of architectural hardware changes.

#### A. Domain Block Memory Mapping

The general strategy for the countermeasure is to invert the DoS method. The method assigns WS in the cache to OS-domains. This is achieved by the introduction of Domain Blocks (DB). The DBs are later mapped to the particular OS-domains. A DB is a memory region that is assigned to a specified region of a set of WSs in LLC. In Figure 6 the method is depicted. The example shows a DB mapping for two memory partitions. As a result, there are two different “colors” for DBs in this case. A single DB consists of a set of MLs. The DBs describe an alternating pattern within the main memory. In the example, a cache with 2048 WS is assumed. To split the cache literally into two halves, a DB consists of 1024 ML. Generally, the size of a DB is calculated through:

\[
DB_{size} = \frac{WS_{count} \ast CL_{size}}{Domains} \quad (5)
\]

The DBs will be mapped to the OS-domains using the second stage MMU. The mappings in the Level 3 descriptors are generated as follows: The input address space, represented by the IPA, must be consecutive for a proper operation of the OS. The output addresses (PA) are generated with regard to the proposed pattern. Since each entry in the TT describes a 4096 Byte page in the main memory, each page contains 64 MLs with a size of 64 Byte. To contain 1024 MLs, 16 pages form a single DB. The mappings are generated using the Algorithm 2. The PA space for the main memory starts at address 0x80000000. For OS – domain\(_1\) IPA space starts at 0x80000000 and for OS – domain\(_2\) at 0xA0000000. The algorithm iterates through the whole address space of the main memory.

**Algorithm 2 Generate Level 3 TT**

\[
IPA_1 \leftarrow 0\times80000000; IPA_2 \leftarrow 0\timesA0000000
\]

\[
PA_1 \leftarrow 0\times80000000, PA_2 \leftarrow 0\times80010000
\]

\[
Pagesize \leftarrow 0\times1000
\]

\[
\text{for } j = 0; j \leq Memory_{size}; j + = \text{DB}_{size} \text{ do}
\]

\[
\text{for } i = 0; i \leq 16; i + = \text{Pagesize} \text{ do}
\]

\[
IPA_{[1,2]} \iff IPA_{[1,2]} + = \text{Pagesize}
\]

\[
PA_{[1,2]} \iff PA_{[1,2]} + = \text{Pagesize}
\]

end for

\[
IPA_{[1,2]} \iff IPA_{[1,2]} + = \text{Pagesize}
\]

\[
PA_{[1,2]} \iff PA_{[1,2]} + = \text{DB}_{size} \ast 2
\]

end for

The maximum number of OS-domains, respectively CPUs, supported by this method is dependent on the cache size, \( CL_{Size} \) and on the minimum pagesize supported by the TT. Assuming an ARMv7 architecture the minimum pagesize is set to 4KiB and the \( CL_{Size} \) is 64 Byte.

\[
\text{Domains} = \frac{WS_{Count} \ast Pagesize}{CL_{Size}} \quad (6)
\]

In the example configuration, 32 OS-domains or CPUs would be supported.
There are multiple possibilities to map these pages. For example, in the introduced algorithm, the DBs are optimized to the maximum size. To some extent, this avoids a high fragmentation of the PA memory.

B. Implementation Issues

In the results we show that the proposed mapping scheme is applicable to prohibit DoS attacks in shared caches. However, the implementation of the scheme involves certain challenges in system development. As mentioned previously, the system setup is statically defined and initialized during bootup. To implement the proposed mapping, the initialization of the second stage MMU must be completed before the OS images or configuration files such as Device Tree Blobs are loaded into the main memory. This is problematic, since the second stage MMU is commonly initialized using an identity mapping, which means there is no remapping of memory pages. Since, we divide the main memory into DBs, this scheme has to be considered on loading the OS-images. Basically the images are bigger than the 64KiB DBs, so they have to be loaded with respect to that pattern.

Furthermore, the proposed memory mapping scheme demands a special treatment of direct memory accesses of other subsystems connected to the common system interconnect. Direct memory accesses are preformed on consecutive PA memory areas. In order to use DMA capabilities of certain resources, the maximum transfer size needs to be limited and aligned to the DBs. Otherwise, the IPA address space needs to be established to the DMA capable resource. This requires that the DMA device is aware of the mapping scheme, and is able to translate the IPA addresses which are communicated by the OS-domains into the real PA residing in the main memory.

C. Cost Estimation

The introduction of the proposed memory mapping will introduces overhead by retrieving the mapping entries from the MMU translation tables. This might be caused by additional table walks. A full translation table lookup is called a translation table walk. As mentioned previously, the MMU translation tables are concatenated into different levels, where each level describes a finer-grained amount of data, from the higher to the lower level. Using a consecutive memory mapping the granularity of Level 2 block descriptors are sufficient to produce a proper system mapping. According to the domain block mapping, Level 3 descriptors which map to 4KiB pages need to be used rather than the 2MiB blocks in Level 2. This implies that a lookup for an output PA needs to walk through the Levels 1 to 3, whereas Level 3 has a very high amount of entries. This overhead is also quantified in the measurement results in Section VIII.

VII. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

This section will give an overview of the system setup that was used to produce the results given in Section VIII. To produce the results a SoC platform was chosen which is available to the public domain. Therefore, a Pandaboard [14] that incorporates the Texas Instruments OMAP5 SoC and a set of peripherals necessary for ICM-applications is used. The OMAP5 implements a multi processing unit (MPU) subsystem with two ARM Cortex-A15 processors. The MPUs have a direct connection to the main memory or an external memory interface (EMIF). Each Cortex-A15 core has a private L1 64KiB (32KiB each for instructions and data) cache and a shared 2MiB L2 (unified) cache. The cache line size is 64 Byte and has 2048 WS.

Two OSs run on the platform, the adversary and the victim OS-domain. Both OS-domains consists of an upstream Linux Kernel (Version 3.8.13) and a suitable root file system. The methods to measure the proposed effects are implemented on OS-level, using Linux kernel modules.

In order to obtain the results the following functions have been implemented.

- **measure-loop()**: The Loop simply executes iterations over a set of data. During each iteration it loads from a ML into a CPU register using the ARM LDR instruction.
- **DoS-loop()**: Compares to the measure-loop without time measurements.
- **get_time()**: Timestamps at start and end of each iteration to determine the CPU cycles consumed.
- **prepare_cachelines()**: Determines the CLs to the targeted WS.
- **get_next_CL()**: Iterates through the CLs.

The loops iterate over a set of ML/CLs determined by the equations given in Section V.

```plaintext
measure_loop() {
    for (k = 0; k < TEST ITERATIONS; k++) {
        reset_timer();
        prepare_cachelines();
        for (l = 0; l < value; l++) {
            start = get_time();
            get_next_CL();
            end = get_time();
            cycles += end - start;
        }
    }
}
```

Listing 1. Pseudo code to measure the latency

VIII. RESULTS

According to Section V and to VI, the methods have been evaluated. The results are obtained by measuring latencies of memory accesses.
The measurements are performed as follows: The victim OS-domain logs the latency of its memory accesses by producing a characteristic workload through the access of a specific domain block. The adversary-OS works on the same amount of data within the same domain-block set. The following characteristics are considered:

- **CPU cycle count**: Number of cycles consumed by an operation. This value quantifies the duration of a measurement. The cycle count was taken from the timer subsystem of the experimental platform.
- **CL count**: Number of CLs allocated and iterated throughout the measurement.
- **DoS impact**: This value describes the percentage increase of the CPU cycle count of an operation being interfered with.

In order to produce the results the arithmetic mean value of the measurements has been computed. During the measurements some factors have been observed which produce particular outliers. Those factors are caused by functionalities such as cache prediction [15] or bus usage. Technically, it would be possible to turn off those processor features, but this would not produce real world results, because an adversary is not able to do so. The general aim was to prove that the concept fits the predictions rather than to build a polished output.

### A. Denial of Service Impact

In the first measurement is shown how the thrashing impact compares to the number of CLs iterated in a single WS. Both systems run the DoS-loop and measure the latency concurrently. The results to prove the DoS method are depicted in Figure 7. The most significant impact to the execution performance of the victim OS peaks at about 457 percent. This means that by using the attack vector, it is possible to delay the execution of an operation up to this value. Another value observed is the number of CLs that have been allocated to cause the interference. The highest peak of interference appears when the victim and the attacker are using 16 CLs, meaning a full WS. If both systems use the same full WS the possibility that a single CL must be replaced by the cache is highest. As a result, the prediction of the attack model to overcommit a common WS is proven to be true.

One of the most important results obtained is the maximum thrashing impact. Here, the victim OS executes the measure-loop with latency measurement and the adversary OS only the DoS-loop. The results are shown in Figure 8. For these measurements both systems iterate over 16 CL, which produces the highest impact (compare Figure 7). Table II gives an overview of all observed values. In the test runs, the mean cycle count of a memory access is about 3,602. By activating the DoS-loop the cycle count increases up to 132,803. This implies a DoS impact of about 3686%. Compared to the value of the previous graph, the significantly higher result is justified by the frequency of the DoS-loop. If a single iteration of the DoS-loop runs without the latency marks, then the CPU cycle count per step is lower.

### B. Domain Block Mapping

To evaluate the effect of the DB memory mapping, the measurements made after establishing the mappings. The results in Figure 9 compare the CPU cycles consumed during a data fetch. According to the measurements with the normal mapping both systems iterate through the same full WS. The normal execution of the measure-loop reveals a mean cycle count of 3,599. By applying the DoS-loop to the measurement, the cycle count rises to 8,911. Consequently, this results in a DoS impact of about 247.55%. By comparing the mean cycle counts of DB and normal mapping the DoS impact subsides significantly.

As mentioned above, the mapping method on second stage MMU level implies three table walks to convert the IPA input address to the PA output address. In order to quantify the cost...
of the additional table walk the latency of the measure-loop has been observed with the original 2 MiB Level 2 mapping and the domain block mapping which resides in the Level 3 TT. The results show that the DB mapping method adds no performance overhead to the memory accesses. The mean CPU cycles remain at 3,602 in normal mapping and 3,599 using the DB mapping. A feasible reason for not being able of quantifying the estimated cost is the translation lookaside buffers (TLB) of the MMUs. Particularly in this architecture the TLBs stores up to 512 translations. Since, in the scenario only 32 different CLs are accessed, these translations reside inside the TLB.

The evaluation shows on the one hand that the DoS caused by the thrashing of the LLC is feasible and on the other hand that the countermeasure is able to substantially mitigate these effects. Furthermore, the performance overhead for domain blocking is negligible. Nevertheless, the DoS impact on the DB mapping might be caused by the bus interconnect which transports the data from main memory through the caches to the CPUs. The results reveal that the interconnection bus, which implements the ARM AMBA AXI specification [16], between the cache and the main memory introduces a surface for interference.

IX. CONCLUSION

In this article, a method has been introduced to mitigate the surface for DoS attacks. The method is based on the partitioning of memory lines within the main memory. According to the way-set associativity, these partitions, so called domain blocks, can be assigned to OS-domains. The mapping is enforced using a MMU within the stage-two memory address translation. Additionally the method fits to the system design paradigm.

Furthermore, this article shows the significance and the need for a solution to mitigate or prohibit DoS attacks in shared last level caches. In addition to that, the implementation of the attack vector is used as a metric to quantify and evaluate our proposed solution. This proposed domain block mapping breaks the AMP-paradigm down to the shared caches of CPU-subsystems in SoCs. Since the approach uses the second-stage MMU which is used by the system anyway, the cost of the method is kept at a negligible level. The method enables a more reliable implementation of AMP-based multi-OSs on MP-SoCs using shared caches, without the need to modify the hardware layout. The method and the results also have impact on other disciplines related to SoCs. In the field of real-time research, it can be used to make memory access more predictable, regardless of implementing a multi-OS or not.

The consideration focuses on a dual core CPU subsystem. In the future, the technique can be applied and evaluated on SoCs that incorporate quad (or more) core processors sharing a last level cache. The proposed domain blocks make it necessary to break the mapping down to the fully-addressable space on the SoC. Therefore, solutions to establish these domain blocks to devices which access the main memory directly must be considered. Furthermore, the cache interconnection bus provides a further surface for interference. In future this particular aspect has to be foused to fit better to the AMP system design.

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